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The 2014-2015 West Africa Ebola Outbreak was the largest the World has ever seen. It 
started in December 2013 and was left unnoticed for 3 months, allowing for the virus to 
keep spreading uncontrollably and for the outbreak to keep escalating until it was 
declared an International emergency in August 2014. 
Both short and long term complications have been reported on EVD survivors, ranging 
from physical to psychological and social and, in addition, the persistence of EVD in 
selected body compartments of the survivors (i.e.: semen) poses a great risk of 
reintroduction of the virus in areas where transmission has previously been eliminated. 
This study aimed to identify the symptoms presented by 10 non-randomized EVD 
survivors both during the acute stage of the disease and months after recovery and 
understand if there was any relation between these two stages. The most common 
symptoms recorded during the active stage of EVD were weight loss, joint pain and 
fever; and months after were headache, fatigue, weakness and back pain. Sixty per cent 
of survivors presented months after recovery with one or more of the symptoms they 
had during the acute stage of the disease, being headache the most common symptom to 
persist, followed by weakness. However, all survivors presented with one or more 
symptom months after recovery, regardless of the symptoms existing during the acute 
stage of the disease. 
The pathogenic and biological events that lead to the development of PEVDS are still 
unclear and more studies still need to be done on that subject. However, taking in 
consideration a symptomatic approach, this particular study concludes that the severity 
of the disease in its acute stage doesn‟t seem to be associated with the severity of the 
sequelae, also known as post-EVD syndrome. 
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A epidemia pelo vírus Ébola que devastou a África Ocidental em 2014-2015 foi a maior 
que o Mundo testemunhou até hoje. Começou em Dezembro de 2013 e permaneuceu 
indetectável durante 3 meses, permitindo que o vírus se continuasse a espalhar de forma 
descontrolada e para a epidemia escalar até ao ponto em que foi declarada uma 
emergencia internacional em Agosto de 2014. 
Consequências a curto e longo prazo têm sido documentadas em sobreviventes, 
variando desde físicas, a psicológicas e sociais. Além disso, a permanência do vírus em 
determinados compartimentos biológicos de sobreviventes (ex: sémen) colocam os 
países em alto risco do vírus voltar a ser introduzido em comunidades onde este já foi 
eliminado. 
Este estudo procurou identificar os sintomas de 10 sobreviventes da doença pelo vírus 
Ébola, escolhidos de forma não aleatória, tanto no momento em que estavam com a 
doença na sua fase activa como nos meses de convalescença, e verificar se haveria 
alguma relação entre os dois. Os sintomas mais comuns durante a fase activa da doença 
foram perda de peso, artralgia e febre; e nos meses de convalescença foram cefaleias, 
fadiga, astenia e lombalgias. Sessenta por cento dos sobreviventes apresentavam na fase 
de convalescença, um ou mais dos sintomas que tinham durante a fase activa da doença, 
sendo as cefaleias o sintoma mais comum a persistir, seguido de astenia. No entanto, 
todos os sobreviventes apresentavam no mínimo um sintoma meses após a fase activa 
da doença, independentemente dos sintomas que haviam desenvolvido na fase activa. 
Os eventos biológicos e patogénicos que estão envolvidos no desenvolvimento do 
síndrome pós-Ébola ainda não são claros e mais estudos são necessários nesta área. No 
entanto, e tendo em consideração uma abordagem sindromática, este estudo em 
particular conclui que a gravidade da doença pelo vírus Ébola na sua fase aguda não 
parece estar associada com a gravidade das sequelas apresentadas, também conhecidas 
como síndrome pós-Ébola. 
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The Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) Outbreak that occurred in West Africa during 2014 and 
2015 was the largest Ebola epidemic the World has ever known. I got the chance to go 
to Sierra Leone, the country with the highest number of reported cases, during the 
months of August to October 2015 as nurse working for a Spanish Non-Governmental 
Organization – Médicos del Mundo – and work at an Ebola Holding Centre in Kumala, 
Koinadugu district. By that time, this area in particular hadn‟t seen an Ebola case in 
over 100 days but there was an existing high number of survivors, which led me to this 
dissertation where I will compare the symptoms these survivors had upon admission to 
the Holding Centre (EVD clinical features) and the complications they had in the 
convalescence stage (post-EVD syndrome) to see if there is any correlation between the 
two. 
 
1.1. Ebola virus disease 
The Ebola Virus Disease is a hemorrhagic fever 
caused by a virus from the Filoviridae family, 
Ebolavirus (EBOV) genus, that can infect only a 




Within the EBOV genus there are five different 
species, four of these capable of causing disease 
to humans – Ebola virus (Zaire ebolavirus), 
Sudan virus (Sudan ebolavirus), Taï Forest virus 
(Taï Forest ebolavirus, formely known as Côte 




The natural reservoir for this virus is still unknown. However there is evidence that 
several mammal species can harbour and transmit the virus and several bat species have 
been found to carry filoviruses
2
, leading researchers to believe that 1) the virus is 
animal-borne; 2) that the bats are the most likely reservoirs
1
 (specifically the fruit bats 
Fig. 1 The Ebolavirus. 
http://www.cdc.gov/media/dpk/201
4/images/ebola-outbreak/img8.jpg 




from the Pteropodidae family
4
); and 3) that the first patient becomes infected through 
contact with an infected animal, such as a fruit bat or a primate, or even through the 
practice of eating bush meat or food contaminated with bat faeces; this is known as the 
spillover event 
3,13
 – event in which a pathogen from one species moves into another, 
resulting in a potential outbreak.
14
 
After the first human becomes infected, the virus can spread from human to humans via 
direct contact, such as through broken skin or mucous membranes, with 1) blood, 
secretions, organs or bodily fluids of a person sick or who has died from EVD; 2) 
objects contaminated with these fluids; 3) infected fruit bats or primates; and 4) sexual 
contact with the semen from a man who has recovered from EVD.
3,4
 The virus is not 
spread through the air, water or food
3
 and infection through intact skin is unlikely but 
not entirely excluded.
19
 Also, the virus is not transmissible until the infected person 
starts to develop symptoms (incubation period).
21
 
The most infectious bodily fluids are blood, faeces and vomit, however the Ebola virus 
has also been detected in breast milk, urine and semen and can persist in the last for at 
least 70 days
5
 not being known for how long it can remain, since different men may 
take different amounts of time for the virus to leave the semen.
3
 A study done in Sierra 
Leone in 2015 showed that the viral load in the semen remained high for as long as nine 
months after the initial disease.
22
 
In early epidemics, the re-use of non-sterile needles was a significant way of 
transmission in healthcare settings; however this risk is now substantially low and direct 
contact with an infected person or their bodily fluids is the main way of transmission.
13
 
In the 2014 West Africa‟s Ebola Outbreak, direct contact with a person or bodily fluids 
of a person who has died from EVD has also shown to be a major transmission source; 
especially since it occurred in countries where traditional funeral ceremonies are 
practiced.
15
 These practices include directly touching or washing the body, followed by 
distribution of personal property of the deceased.
17
 “In the remains of the deceased 
victims, Ebola lives on” (Haglage, 2015) since all the bodily fluids of the deceased are 
filled with lethal viral loads able to infect anyone who touches it.
16
 WHO mentions that 
at least 20% of new Ebola infections during the West Africa outbreak occurred during 






Aside from funeral practices, healthcare providers and family members caring for EVD 
patients are at the highest risk of contracting the disease thus, the healthcare settings are 
the places where the disease tends to spread more quickly, especially if the healthcare 
providers are not wearing appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) (Fig.2). 
All personnel caring for an Ebola patient must wear full PPE that completely covers 
clothing, skin and mucous membranes.
8
 According to the CDC (2015), the principals 
for wearing PPE are as follows: 
 Dressing: 
Following the proper order (appendix 1); 
Before entering the patient care area; 
Observed and guided by a trained observer. 
 During patient care: 
PPE must remain in place; 
Never be adjusted; 
Frequent and appropriate disinfection of gloved hands with strong chlorine 
solution, especially after contact with bodily fluids; 
In case of accidental exposure (breach in PPE) to a potentially contaminated 
fluid, the person must immediately move to the Undressing area to remove PPE 
and assess the exposure. There should be a facility exposure management plan 
that needs to be followed. 
 Undressing: 
To be performed in a designed area for the purpose; 
In the presence and guidance of a trained observer and an undressing assistant, if 
needed; 
PPE must be removed slowly and in the correct sequence (appendix 1) in order 






Fig. 2 The materials that constitute the PPE, according to the Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) 




After infection, development of disease is a complex interplay between virus, host and 
environment (Goeijenbier et al, 2014).
19
 
Once tissue invasion occurs, through infected fluid that comes in contact with broken 
skin or mucosa, the virus tends to invade monocytes, macrophages and dendritic cells 
that then migrate to the regional lymph nodes and disseminate.
13
 The infection of these 
cells induces an inflammatory state with high levels of proinflammatory cytokines and 




that then develops into disseminated intravascular coagulation. All of these events 
together can lead to a state of severe shock and death.
21 
Even though the mentioned cells are the preferred targets of the virus, it has a wide cell 
tropism and can infect several cell types
13
, such as fibroblasts, hepatocytes, adrenal 
gland tissue, epithelial and endothelial cells
19
; the infection of these last mentioned cells 
tends to occur in the final stages of the disease
18
, compromising vascular integrity
20
. 
The replication of the virus inside the infected cells is an extremely efficient and rapid 
process, leading to a very high viral load very quickly. It is also thought that the death 
of the infected cells also plays an important role in the disease‟s symptoms, like the 
decreased ability of the immune system to respond to the infection due to the death of 
infected lymphocytes or a decreased production of the clotting factor due to the death of 
hepatocytes.
19 
From a haematological perspective, leucopenia, lymphopenia and increased liver 




The bleeding complications noted in some of the patients in the more advanced stages 
of the disease are associated with an overexpression of tissue factor in monocytes and 
macrophages, leading to an (over)activation of the extrinsic pathway of coagulation 
followed by coagulopathy and eventually disseminated intravascular coagulation.
19
 
The host immune response will dictate the outcome of the disease.
13
 An early and well 
regulated inflammatory responses in association with the prompt release of pro-
inflammatory cytokines in asymptomatic patients, is linked with the survival from EVD, 
suggesting that the innate response plays a crucial role in controlling the infection at its 
early stages. Fatally-infected patients however are associated with a lack of an early 
inflammatory response with a massive infection of monocytes and macrophages, the 
preferred cells of the virus, inducing the release of anti-inflammatory products and 
probably contributing to the suppression of the inflammatory responses.
18
 
Lethal EVD, due to shock, haemorrhage and multi-organ failure, usually takes place 
between 6 to 16 days after the initial onset of symptoms. However, if the patient 
recovers, this is accompanied by a development of antibody response
19




from the virus for at least 10 years.
24
 It‟s unknown whether this immunity could be life-
long or if a new infection with a different species of the EBOV may occur later on.
24
 
Survival from EVD depends on good supportive care and the patient‟s immune 
response.
24




Upon infection there‟s an incubation period that ranges from 2 to 21 days, during which 
time the individual is not infectious;
4
 after that, symptoms will start to develop and the 
victim becomes more and more infectious as the viral load increases. 
The early signs and symptoms are non-specific and can mimic other common tropical 
diseases such as malaria, dengue, typhoid fever and other viral infections, which makes 
it difficult for an early clinical diagnosis.
2,13





 Joint and muscle pain 
 Sore throat 
Progressive gastrointestinal symptoms usually develop within 3 to 5 days from initial 
symptoms onset: vomiting, diarrhoea, abdominal pain (stomach), nausea, leading to 
electrolyte imbalance, intravascular volume depletion and shock. Other symptoms as 
skin rash, hiccups, conjunctival infection, respiratory and neurologic finding may also 
occur. Hemorrhagic complications appear as a late sign, in less than 20% of patients, 
alongside with multiple organ failure, and it is usually associated with a bad prognosis. 
Overall, clinical deterioration may progress in a rapid way and may result in death 
within 7 to 10 days of symptoms onset.
2,4,7,19
 However, there‟s a 75% chance of survival 
if the patient lives through the second week of infection.
13
 
According to a study done in Sierra Leone between May 25
th
 and June 18
th
 of 2014, the 
incubation period ranged from 6 to 12 days, the case fatality rate was 74% and the most 
common clinical features were: fever (89%), headache (80%), weakness (66%), 




symptoms associated with a fatal outcome were fever, weakness, dizziness and 
diarrhoea and also, in patients aged above 45 years old (94%) or patients with 10 
million or more EBOV copies per millilitre of blood (also 94%).
53
 These results are in 





 of 2014 by Lado et al, where the most common clinical features were 
fever or history of fever (83%), intense fatigue or weakness (68%), vomiting or nausea 
(50%) and diarrhoea (41%).
54
 
Rapid and reliable diagnosis of EVD is essential for appropriate and effective patient 
management, hospital or health center infection prevention and control, and 
optimization of use of healthcare resources (Martinez et al, 2015).
2
 
Due to the non-specificity of the initial symptoms and on an human epidemic context, 
EVD diagnosis is based on the clinical manifestations of the patient and a known 
contact history with an infected individual in the 21 days prior to the onset of 
symptoms.
21
 If a person has developed symptoms concordant with an EBOV infection 
and there is reason to believe that EVD should be considered, then the individual must 
be isolated and public health professionals notified. Blood samples are then collected 
for testing and confirmation of infection.
1
 
Some of the investigations used to confirm an EBOV infection are:
4
 
 Antibody-capture enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA); 
 Antigen-capture detection tests; 
 Serum neutralization test; 
 Reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) assay; 
 Electron microscopy; 
 Virus isolation by cell culture. 
These must all be performed in maximum biological containment conditions due to the 
extreme biohazard risk of the samples.
4
 
Prior to 2000, the gold standard for EBOV laboratory detection were antigen detection 
methods, such as the ELISA, since it has a high sensitivity rate (93%) in the acute stage 
of the illness. However, as the disease progresses the antigen levels decline and the 




ELISA has been replaced by RT-PCR (reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction) 
testing, allowing a more rapid and portable detection.
2
 
RT-PCR is a rapid and highly sensitive nucleic acid amplification test and has a very 




Through the use of RT-PCR the virus can be detected 48 hours after infection
19
, 
therefore false negative results may occur in the first 2-3 days of the disease since the 
molecular assay may not be able to detect the genome in such an early stage
2
, reason 
why it is important to take another blood sample 24 to 48 hours after the first one to 
confirm the result. 
During the 2014-2015 West Africa‟s outbreak the development of rapid diagnostic tests 
has showed viable options for EBOV diagnosis, with suggestions of sensitivity of 100% 
and specificity of 90%. Although this is an extremely promising tool it is still not used 
in daily practice.
2
 Some example of this tests are the RealStar Filovirus Screen RT-PCR 




Fig. 3 Assays for detecting filovirus infections approved for emergency use by the US FDA and 
WHO (Su et al, 2016). 
 
Management of EVD is based on early recognition of infection, accompanied by 
effective isolation and the provision of the best available symptomatic and supportive 
care, including rehydration, maintenance of electrolyte balance, nutrition, pain relief 
and effective blood volume, through blood transfusions, if needed. The main goal of 






According to the WHO guidelines, treatment of patients with suspected or confirmed 
EVD in Ebola Treatment Centres (ETC‟s) had the following principles: 
 Provide basic care such as food and water; 
 Patients with fever, especially those with diarrhoea and vomiting, should be 
encouraged to drink fluids and as much oral rehydration solution (ORS) as can 
be tolerated; 
 Malaria treatment should be provided to all patients with fever, in accordance 
with national guidelines; 
 Medicines to control symptoms can be given orally (fig. 4). Since injections 
would increase the risk of staff infection can only be given by appropriately 
trained and assigned staff inside the centre; 
 If sufficient oversight is available, oral antibiotics may be given to treat apparent 
bacterial infections; 









The quality of the care provided is strictly related to the outcome of the disease, for 
example, the difficulties that patient‟s face in accessing basic medical care in resource 
poor rural settings reflects a higher case-fatality rate of the disease. Also, failure to 





provide full supportive care to the suspected cases
1
 may result in substandard care for 
these, who may later be found to have a treatable disease such as malaria.
2,13
 
Specific antiviral medication is still in experimental stages
19
 and there are 2 potential 
vaccines undergoing human safety testing
4
, in the meantime and for effective control of 
an active EVD outbreak, several measures need to be implemented, with an emphasis to 
case management, surveillance and contact tracing, good and safe laboratory service, 





Fig. 5 Structure of the different committees involved in EVD outbreak control activities, 




Good infection control practices, such as disinfection of contaminated areas and objects 
(including the patient‟s home and belongings), also plays a vital role in reducing 
transmission, plus an attempt on early diagnosis and the use of barriers while 
performing patient care, like PPE.
13,21
 
                                                          
1




A study done in Kailahun district, Sierra Leone, found that control can be accomplished 
by using interventions based on identification and appropriate management of those at 
risk of developing EVD.
65
 
During an outbreak, a combination of Ebola-like symptoms with a high-risk exposure – 
contact with an EVD patient or body fluids, objects contaminated with body fluids of a 
person who has died from EVD, attendance to a funeral, contact with an infected animal 
(fruit bats or primates), contact with the semen of an EVD survivor, visit to a local 
healthcare or to a known endemic area within the last 21 days – are enough to proceed 
with isolation and management protocols. It is however essential that there are sufficient 
patient care capacity and staffing in the specialist facilities.
19,23,65
 
Asymptomatic patients with known epidemiological risk factors and persons who may 
have come in contact with infected patients (called contacts) are considered to be at risk 
of infection and may need monitoring during the duration of the incubation period.
25
 
These should be immediately isolated in a room with private bathroom, all attending 
healthcare personnel must wear PPE and all contaminated materials must be treated as 
potentially infectious.
13
 The recognition of these patients is done by a process called 
contact tracing
2
 (appendix 2) that allows a rapid recognition of symptoms with 
immediate isolation, testing and provision of care of new cases, thus preventing the 
future spread of EBOV.
13,25
 
Contact tracing is strictly connected to surveillance (case finding) and case investigation 
measures, since the identification of as EVD case activates a case investigation process 
where contacts are identified and thus initiating the process of contact tracing. This can 
only be effective if it‟s immediately implemented after case finding and efficiently 
managed. 
In order for this to happen, strict definitions must be applied stating what constitutes a 
“contact”, a “suspected EVD case”, a “probable EVD case” and a “confirmed EVD 
case”. The WHO (2015) as defined all of the above as shown on the following table:
26 
 
                                                          
2





Suspected EVD case Any person, alive or dead, suffering or having suffered 
from a sudden onset of high fever and having had contact 
with a suspected, probable or confirmed Ebola case, or a 
dead or sick animal; OR 
Any person with sudden onset of high fever and at least 
three of the following symptoms: headache, vomiting, 
diarrhoea, anorexia/loss of appetite, lethargy, stomach pain, 
aching muscles or joints, difficulty swallowing, breathing 
difficulties, or hiccup; OR 
Any person with unexplained bleeding/haemorrhaging; OR 
Any person with sudden, unexplained death. 
Probable EVD case Any suspected case evaluated by a clinician, OR 
Any person who died from “suspected” EVD and had an 
epidemiological link to a confirmed case but was not tested 
and did not have laboratory confirmation of disease. 
Confirmed EVD case Any suspected or probable cases with a positive laboratory 
result. 
Contact Any person who has been exposed to a suspected, probable, 
or confirmed case of EVD in at least one of the following 
ways (including healthcare workers): 
 Has slept in the same household as a case; 
 Has had direct physical contact with the case 
(alive or dead) during the illness; 
 Has had direct physical contact with the 
(deceased) case at a funeral or during burial 
preparation rituals; 
 Has touched the blood or body fluids (including 
urine, faeces, vomit, tears, or sweat) of a case 
during their illness; 
 Has touched the clothes or linens of a case; 




1.2. Post EVD syndrome
3
 
Both short and long term medical problems have been reported in EVD survivors, 
including mental and physical symptoms. This is referred to as the Post Ebola virus 
disease syndrome (PEVDS). 
Definition of an EVD survivor:
51
 
 Person with a confirmed positive result on RT-PCR testing for Ebola virus on 
any body fluid who subsequently recovered; AND/OR 
 Person who is IgM and/or IgG positive on serological testing for EVD and has 
not been vaccinated against Ebola virus. 
According to Gulland (2015) “preliminary data show that people who experienced the 
severe form of the acute infection were more likely to have serious chronic problems” 
however and for the time being, treatment is still symptomatic and further studies are 
still needed to fully understand the long-term effects of EBOV infection and the clinical 
spectrum that occur during PEVDS.
27,29
 
Some of the symptoms of PEVDS include: 
27,29,51,57,58,61,63
 
 General: fatigue and anorexia; 
 Musculoskeletal: chronic joint pain, often severe and debilitating; 
 Ocular: blurred vision, eye pain, redness, dry eyes, sensitivity to light and, more 
serious, an inflammatory disease that could lead to blindness if left untreated 
called uveitis (seen in 50% of survivors in a study done in Port Loko, Sierra 
Leone, between March 7
th
, 2015 and April 24
th
, 2015); 
 Auditory: hearing loss and tinnitus; 
 Abdominal: pain from unknown cause; 
 Neurological: headache, memory impairment, poor concentration, peripheral 
neuropathy, tremor, sleep disturbances, low mood; 
 Mental health: post-traumatic stress disorder, fear of death, shame, 
stigmatization and depression; many survivors were threatened, attacked, 
                                                          
3
 For the purposes of this thesis, the EVD sequelae will be focused on the Zaire species of the virus, even 






evicted and excluded by their families and communities because they were seen 
as still infectious (some of the psychosocial effects can be found below); 
 
 
Fig. 6 Acute and long-term psychosocial effects of an Ebola epidemic at individual, community 
and international levels (Bortel et al, 2016) 
 
 Sexual health: erectile dysfunction, testicular pain, dyspareunia, pelvic pain, 
menorrhagia/metrorrhagia and amenorrhea; 
 Relapse due to persistent virus and evaluation of new onset fever, since EVD 
survivors rapidly clear the virus from the blood as the acute symptoms resolve 
but the virus may persists for months or years and body sites where the immune 
system has difficulties reaching (immunological sanctuaries), like the inside of 
the eyes (aqueous humour), the central nervous system (cerebrospinal fluid), the 
placenta and amniotic fluid, the mammary gland (breastmilk) and the male 
gonads (semen). 
A good case example of this last point is the case of Pauline, a Scottish nurse who 
contracted the virus while working on an ETC in December 2014 and was evacuated to 
the UK where she was transferred to a high level isolation unit, treated and discharged 
28 days later. After that she developed symptoms compatible with the PEVDS and since 




with a case of meningoencephalitis, from virus that remained in the Central Nervous 
System (appendix 3). More details on the case can be found on the case report done by 
Michael Jacobs et al, 2016.
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It is still not clear what are the relations between the pathogenesis and biological events 
that lead to PEVDS, as is any relation between the severity of the acute disease and the 
frequency or severity of sequelae (part of what this study plans to identify).
63
 According 
to Vetter et al (2016), sequelae could be the result of residual dysfunction from direct 
viral effects during the acute EVD infection, sustained immune activation, delayed 
hypersensibility reaction, molecular mimicry, autoimmune disease, or immune complex 
deposition, individually or in combination. 
The fact that the virus may persist in selected body compartments of the survivors, 
specially the semen, also brings awareness to the possibility of reintroduction of the 
virus in areas where the virus has already been eliminated.
51 
However studies have 
shown that even if the virus still remains active in other body fluids (aside from semen), 
its infectivity it‟s extremely low at this stage.
61,62 
“Despite the persistence of Ebola virus 
in a few body compartments and recrudescence, other than rare reports of suspected 
sexual transmission, there is no conclusive evidence of virus transmission from 
convalescence patients“ (Vetter et al, 2016).
 
After the high amount of sequelae found in this Ebola‟s outbreak survivors and it 
became clear how common this syndrome was, the WHO created a plan to follow-up 
the survivors for weeks and months following discharge from the ETC.
 51
 
These follow-up visits would take place:
 51
 
 2 weeks after discharge; 
 Every month for 6 months following the 2 weeks; 
 Every 3 months until completion of one year; and 
 Continued follow-up as needed after that. 
The first visit would include a general medical history and physical examination, with 
vital signs recording and nutritional evaluation, plus musculoskeletal, ocular, auditory, 
abdominal, neurological, mental health and sexual heath evaluations and a consultation 




employment, shelter and food security, dependents, social support, potential substance 
misuse or dependency and identification of vulnerable individuals. Routine laboratory 
tests would also be done, including full blood counts, creatinine levels, Ebola RT-PCR 
testing, plus any other tests that might be needed, such as a malaria rapid diagnostic test. 
The following visits would be focused on evaluation the areas relevant to the patient‟s 
particular condition, however a complete evaluation, similar to the one done on the first 
visit, should be done at least every 3 months during the first year. The follow-up visits 




1.3. EVD outbreaks 
The virus was first discovered in 1976 in what is now the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, formerly Zaire, and derived its name from the river close to which it was 
discovered – the Ebola River – since then, several outbreaks have appeared sporadically 
in Central Africa.
1,2
 These outbreaks are usually confined to one country and controlled 











To be noted that the map above doesn‟t show all the known outbreaks that happened 
between 1976 and 2015. For example, the 1976 South Sudan outbreak, by the Sudan 
ebolavirus, that made 284 notified cases, was omitted from this map.
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In total the EBOV has been responsible for 33 notified outbreaks in the African 
continent.
2
 The countries where past EVD outbreaks have occurred are: Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Gabon, South Sudan, Ivory Coast, Uganda, Republic of the 












1.4. The 2014 West Africa’s EVD outbreak 
“The 2014 Ebola outbreak is the largest Ebola outbreak in history and the first Ebola 




It started on March 21
st
 2014, when the Ministry of Health of Guinea notified the WHO 
of a rapidly evolving outbreak of EVD. The most affected countries of this outbreak 
were Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone and the rapid spread of the disease occurred due 
to a number of factors including people mobilization and funeral/burial practices.
2,74
 
The total number of notified cases in this outbreak was 28 646 cases, causing 11 323 
deaths and making over 10 000 survivors.
72
 
The first case of EVD in this outbreak (index patient) was retrospectively found to be a 
2 year old boy from the village of Meliandou, Guinea, who on the 26
th
 of December, 
2013, became ill with fever, melena and vomiting and died 2 days later. It is thought 
that the boy became infected by ingesting the meat of an infected wild animal, most 










After his death, the virus remained undetected while creating several chains of fatal 
transmission for over 3 months. It was only in March that the local Guinea health 
officials, MSF and WHO staff recognised something was happening but were unable to 
identify it, therefore, the Ministry of Health of Guinea sent blood samples to the 
institute of Pasteur, in Paris, which identified the causative agent as the Zaire 
ebolavirus, never before seen in this part of the World.
32
 
Personal protective equipment and medical teams rapidly started arriving in the country, 
from both WHO and other Organizations in response to the Outbreak, however, by late 
March the virus had entered the capital city of Conakry and there were uncontrollable 
numbers of new cases emerging both in the capital and other parts of the country. 
Foreign medical teams kept pouring in but the outbreak was out of control.
32
In April, the number of new cases was 
increasing by 3.75 per day in Guinea 
and continued to increase until it 
reached 19.07 new cases per day in 




Liberia reported its first case on the 30
th
 
of March 2014 and saw a more 
attenuated beginning of the outbreak, 
recording only an increase of 0.15 new 
cases per day in April 2014 but growing 




Sierra Leone was the most affected the 
country of all, beginning the case 
reporting on the 25
th
 of May 2015 and 
while in May it was only recording an 
increase of 0.44 new cases per day it 
reached and astounding peak of 65.23 






Fig. 10 Weekly reported new cases between 
23
rd
 of March 2014 and 3
rd








Fig. 11 Total reported suspected, probable and confirmed cases in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra 
Leone between 25
th
 March 2014 and 14
th




1.4.1. 2014 West Africa’s EVD outbreak major events timeline 
 The outbreak was first acknowledged in March, 2014; 
 By the end of the month it had already spread to Liberia; 
 It entered Sierra Leone in May; 
 “In June, the MSF described the Ebola Outbreak as out of control” (BBC, 2016); 
 By July, two US workers contracted EBOV and had to be evacuated to the USA; 
 Still in July the virus entered Nigeria and two leading doctors on the subject died 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone; 
 The outbreak is declared as an International Public Health Emergency by the 
WHO on the 8
th
 of August, 2014; 
 By the end of August the virus enters Senegal and in October, Mali, via 
imported cases from Guinea; 
 Between September and December 2014, two more US worker, plus a Spaniard 





 Germany, Norway, France, Italy Switzerland and the UK all treat patients who 
contract the virus in West Africa; 
 The outbreaks in Nigeria, Senegal and Mali were of small proportions and all 
had been declared Ebola free by January 2015.
39,41
 
A full info graphic with the timeline of the events during this outbreak can be found 
on Appendix 4. 
 
 




1.4.2 The Ebola Response 
After the declaration of the outbreak as an International Public Health Emergency by 
the WHO in August, several public health interventions needed to be established, 
including: “early identification of cases; appropriate treatment of people with EVD; 




burial practices that were safe in terms of EVD-transmission risk and dignified in terms 
of allowing culturally-appropriate grieving” (WHO, 2015), accompanied by strong 
social mobilization.
46
 With this in mind an “Ebola Response Roadmap” document was 
created that same month, with the purpose of assisting governments and partners in the 
revision and resourcing of country-specific operational plans for Ebola Response, and 
the coordination of international support for their full implementation.
43
 
The United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) was 
established in September 2014 to complement the Ebola Response Roadmap. It did this 
by “providing of a common operational platform for enhancing response activities and 
for addressing the broader consequences of the outbreak” (WHO, 2014).
43  
It remained 
active until July 2015, when the response went back to being led by the WHO in 
partnership with the local National Ebola Response Centres (NERC).
44,45 
During the Ebola Response and on an international level, the WHO was responsible for 













Overall, the Ebola Emergency Response defined five objectives: 
1) Stop the outbreak; 
2) Treat the infected; 
3) Ensure essential services; 
4) Preserve stability; 
5) Prevent further outbreaks. 
 
The response planned to accomplish the objectives through four main activities: 
1) Case management; 
2) Case finding, lab and contact tracing; 
3) Safe and dignified burials; 
4) Community engagement and social mobilization.44  
 
1.4.2.1. Case management 
The WHO priority activities in this area were: 
 Ebola treatment centres with full infection prevention & control (IPC) activities; 
 Ebola referral/isolation centers (holding centers); 
 Referral processes for primary health care facilities; 




This was achieved by creating over 60 specialized Ebola Treatment Centres (ETC‟s), 
plus over 63 Ebola Community Care Centres (CCC‟S) – that later had the name 
changed to Holding Centers (HC‟s) – in the three most-affected countries and by having 
more than 40 organizations and 58 foreign medical teams having been deployed with an 
estimate of 2 500 international personnel operating on these centers in partnership with 
ministries of health and thousands of national staff. 
In partnership with other NGO‟s, the WHO was able to provide more than one million 
sets of PPE and extensive training for health and front-line workers on infection control 




This expanded capacity to isolate cases, along with safe and dignified burials and 
behavioral changes in communities were key factors in controlling the outbreak, even 
though many cases were still not coming forwards for isolation and treatment leading to 




ETC‟s and HC‟s were the places where most of the care for patients with EVD took 
place. In these centres, EVD infected people would be isolated and receive basic 
curative and palliative care, with access to food, hydration, clean clothes and linen.
46
 
Treatment itself has already been described previously. 
The health aid workforce in these centres was formed of both international and local 
staff that had been trained for this purpose, including training on the protocols of the 
facility, procedures to be followed if exposure occurs by accident and a temperature 




Both centres had a similar layout: 
46
 
Red zone Green zone 
Care of patients suspected or confirmed to 
have EVD. 
All activities that don‟t pose a risk of EVD 
transmission: 
Clean and disinfect contaminated objects. - Counselling 
Burn waste. - Rest areas for staff  and family 
Morgue. - Supporting services, such as 
administration, stores, pharmacy, 
kitchen and laundry for staff‟s PPE. 
 
The movement of staff inside the centre should always be done from clean to more 
contaminated areas, including for cleaning purposes (more information on cleaning 






Entrance to the red zone had to be done through the PPE dressing area and to exit, 
through the PPE removal area, thus making sure that every member of staff in the red 
area was wearing FULL PPE.
46
 




Fig. 14 Centres design and layout (WHO, 2015)
46 
 
There would be hand washing stations on the entrance and exit of every area inside the 
centre, both inside the red and green zones and including the entrance/exit of the centre 




based handrub, although many centres didn‟t have these resources and so, chlorine 
solutions at a concentration of 0.05% (weak solution), applied for a minimum of 40 to 
60 seconds were used and considered appropriate.
46
 
Chlorine solutions at a concentration of 0.5% (strong solution) was also available in all 
centres (mandatory) and was used to clean all the materials that came in contact with 
suspected, probable or confirmed EVD cases, including PPE, the table in the triage area, 
the patient‟s area and belongings (ex: plates, utensils, bedpans and waste buckets), 
patient‟s latrines and showers, any spills of body fluids and dead bodies.
46
 
Both weak and strong chlorine solutions should be prepared daily in a mixing dedicated 
area and following an adequate protocol.
46
 
All solid infected waste, including PPE, had to be incinerated daily in a burn waste or 
also called “burning pit” designate for this purpose, which would be located in the red 
area and down-wind from the centre.
46
 
Every patient would enter the centre from the Triage area, where a screening/medical 
evaluation would be done in the form of an interview and a temperature reading would 
be taken with an infrared thermometer (appendix 6). If considered to be a suspected or 
probable case of EVD, the patient would be admitted (appendix 7) and grouped into one 
of two categories: dry case (fever plus symptoms other than diarrhoea, vomiting or 
bleeding) or wet case (with diarrhoea, vomiting or bleeding).
46
 
Patients found not likely to have EVD would be given items such as home kits or 
medicines and provided instructions for use and would also be educated on the 
transmission and prevention of EVD and when to return to the ETC/HC.
46
 
After admission and from a patient perspective, the only way out of the centre was 
either trough the “happy shower” (discharge) or through the morgue. 
When recovered, and in order to be eligible to exit the centre (discharge), the patient 
would have to fulfil certain criteria: 
 Patient with fever only and no other symptoms at admission 




o Able to eat and carry out daily routine activities such as walking (taking 
into account any previous disabilities) and washing themselves 
independently. 
 Patient with fever and other symptoms at admission 
o No fever for 72 hours and other symptoms that may be associated with 
EVD disappeared for 72 hours AND 
o Able to eat and carry out daily routine activities such as walking (taking 
into account any previous disabilities) and washing themselves 
independently. 
 If laboratory (PCR) testing is available: 
o A negative test on day  following onset of fever and symptoms, or later 
AND  
o A negative test at least 48 hour after the last positive test.46 
Leaving the facility was done via the “Happy Shower”, which was a joyful event for 
everyone since it meant the person had survived Ebola. All of the patient‟s belongings 
were left behind to be incinerated; the person would enter the “Happy Shower”, have a 




After discharge, a new stage of the patient‟s recovery would begin and included dealing 
with the convalescence stage of the disease, and possible complications that may come 
with it, reintegration in the community and the fight against the stigma that still 
surrounds Ebola and Ebola survivors.
56
 
On discharge it was also important to advice men to use condoms during sexual 
intercourse for at least 3 months, after it became known that the virus could remain 
active in the semen; and alert pregnant women for the fact that miscarriage or foetal 
death could occur. If so, they should attend an ETC or obstetric clinic equipped with 
good infection prevention and control (IPC) practices, including full PPE, for delivery 
of the foetus or any further care needed.46 
All survivors would also receive education and counselling regarding the possible 






 and were also advised to link with their local community engagement staff to 
minimize stigma and discrimination.46 
If the outcome wasn‟t a discharge, the management of dead bodies and burials in the 
centre had to be performed by staff trained in IPC measures and the necessary resources 
should be present, such as full PPE, body bags, disinfectant and appropriate 
transportation. Preferably this should be done by a burial team (more information on 
burial teams on chapter 1.4.2.3.) unless the burial team wasn‟t able to attend the centre 
straight away, in which case, and if all the necessary resources and trained staff was 
present and could safely perform the disinfection of the body and materials, placement 
of the body inside a body bag and movement it to the mortuary area, this could be 
performed by trained centre staff, even though the burial itself should and would always 
be done by the burial team.46 
Despite the number of centres in operation during the peak of the outbreak, the number 
of cases was so high that outgrew the capacity of the ETC‟s and some patients remained 
at home, placing family members at risk.46 Not only the shortness of beds led to people 
staying at home but there were also cases of people who refused to be taken to the ETC 
due to the stigma surrounding it. Many believed that people were taken there to die 
since everyone that would go wouldn‟t return.
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In Sierra Leone, Ebola Holding Centres were created at the peak of the Ebola outbreak 
when ETC‟s couldn‟t‟ provide enough beds for the overwhelming number of new cases 
seen. Therefore, these units were created as a temporary place to admit and isolate 
suspected EVD cases until the confirmatory diagnostic testing results came. Those 
tested positive would then be transferred to the closest ETC and those tested negative 
would be discharged or referred to other health care facilities, such as the hospital or 
their local health care centre.
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The HC‟s worked in a similar way to the ETC‟s, however, according to Zachariah and 
Harries (2015), they were controversial since they could become very overcrowded, 
environmental and personal protection measures were limited, and the fear of 
nosocomial EVD transmission was prevalent. Also, and because the patient‟s wouldn‟t 
be diagnosed or treated for anything else while in the HC‟s, many other diseases 




unnoticed and could lead to serious or even fatal consequences in the centre while 
waiting for the test results, some examples of these are: severe malaria, typhoid fever 
and gastroenteritis. 
 
1.4.2.2. Case finding, laboratory and contact tracing 
The WHO priority activities in these areas were: 
 Case diagnosis: by a WHO-recognized laboratory or by an epidemiologic link to 
case confirmed by a WHO-recognized laboratory in intense transmission areas; 




To achieve these, over 230 experts were sent to 26 mobile laboratories creating an 
ability to test over 750 samples per day and thus, enabling the rapid confirmation of 
cases. 
Also, over 600 public health experts were deployed to the three most-affected countries 
during the course of the outbreak response to assist in surveillance, field epidemiology, 
case finding, contact tracing, information management and epidemiological analysis, 
which was essential to create and follow chains of transmission and finding new cases 
from the contacts lists. Contacts were systematically monitored for 21 days and even 
after the last case had been identified, a long period of surveillance was required to 
ensure that all chains of transmission were found and there was no re-emergence.
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 “Contact tracing is the process of identifying, assessing and managing people who have 
been exposed to a disease to prevent onwards transmission. People who have been 
exposed to EVD are systematically followed for 21 days (the maximum incubation 
period for the disease) from the date of the most recent exposure. This process allows 
for rapid identification of people who become symptomatic. Identifying people at the 
onset of symptoms and promptly isolating them reduces exposure to other persons, 
preventing subsequent EVD infections. Additionally, prompt isolation and admission of 
the symptomatic person to a treatment facility decreases the delay to supportive 






Social mobilization and community engagement efforts are essential to contact tracing 
since it relies on the active participation and cooperation from the affected communities. 
These should trust the teams that are conducting case investigations and contact tracing 










After there‟s been an alert of a possible EVD case, an Investigation team is immediately 
mobilized to investigate and evaluate the person for EVD symptoms, the type of 
exposure and any other EVD risk factors. If they meet the criteria for definition of an 
EVD case, then the Incident Management Framework is activated. Together, the Case 
management team and the investigation team will interview the EVD case (or its family, 
in case the person has already died) and identify all potential contacts since the case‟s 




case went while manifesting EVD symptoms. Failure to identify a single contact may 
lead to ongoing EVD transmission.
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All contacts are then personally interviewed and asked about their last interaction with 
the case, if no risk of exposure is identified, the person will no longer be considered a 
contact, otherwise, they will be educated about the signs and symptoms of EVD and 
preventive measures and explained how getting early treatment improves outcome and 
reduces the risk of infecting others. In case the contact develops symptoms, they are 
instructed to self isolate and notify the team that will then contact the Field 
Epidemiologist, who will activate the case management team and the new case will be 
transported to a transit/isolation unit for further testing. While that happens, new contact 




As a way of following up all contacts, the Contact Follow-up Team should perform 
daily visits to every contact on the list. Ideally contact teams should be assigned to the 
same contacts for all 21 days of follow-up. During this visits, the contact will be asked 
about development of EVD symptoms to him/herself or any other member of the 





1.4.2.3. Safe and dignified burials 
The WHO priority activities in this area were: 
 Supervised burials; 
 Trained and PPE-equipped community burial teams.43 
According to the WHO, a single funeral could be linked to 300 or more Ebola cases.
30
 
In 2014, in the district of Moyamba, Sierra Leone, a single traditional funeral led to a 
sharp increase in what was previously a low-incidence district.
48
 
This is due to the contact between the mourners and the body and belongings of the 




directly touching or washing the body and when family members distribute personal 
property of the diceased.
46, 47
 
Therefore a safe and dignified burial protocol
50
 and 210 burial teams were created 
across the three countries in order to bury everyone suspected or confirmed of having 
died from Ebola in a safe and dignified manner. However, despite this measure, unsafe 
burials continued to happen throughout the outbreak, especially in Guinea and Sierra 
Leone, where some communities believed that there were not enough allowance for 
prayer and spirituality during the burial services.
45
 
 “Immediate, safe, dignified burials by trained teams with appropriate protective 
equipment are critical to interrupt transmission and control Ebola during times of active 
community transmission” (Curran et al, 2016). 
As an example, in the Sierra Leone‟s Red Cross, each burial team had around 10 
people, which included family liason officers, disinfectant sprayers and drivers. The 
people working on these teams were people from the community, not medical 
professionals. Whenever a call came to attend a burial, a swabbing team from the 
ministry of health would go to the site first, to take fluid samples before the burial team 
approached, so that the samples could later on be tested and confirmed whether the 
person died of Ebola or not. However, every death in the community should be 
considered as an Ebola death and handled as such. When the team arrived at the site, 
they would first of all, discuss the burial practice with the family, then, put on their 
PPE, enter the house, place the body of the deceased in a body bag, place the body in a 
coffin previously arranged with the family, sanitize the family‟s environment, remove 
PPE, manage waste and perform hand hygiene, transport the coffin or the body bag to 
the cemetery, perform the burial at the cemetery following the religious practices 




1.4.2.4. Community engagement and social mobilization 
The WHO priority activities in these areas were: 







To achieve this it was essential to build a trust between the local communities and 
frontline workers, through dialogue and education of the community. This included 
engaging anthropologists with the religious leaders of the community, in order to fight 
fear and stigma of the disease, to negotiate alternative religious and cultural practices 
and to encourage the communities to seek treatment. The goal was to create a 
community engagement model, based on best practice, for the safe and rapid roll out of 
Ebola treatment and community care centres.
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The key messages transmitted by the community teams, local organizations and media 
were: 
 Key facts about severity, transmission and importance of early prevention; 
 Information of how to seek treatment for a person with EVD symptoms, how to 
treat a sick family member at home and for those who have full recovered; 
 How to act if there has been a contact with a person alive or dead with EVD; 
 Safe burial practices; 
 Messaged on what practical steps should be taken to stop Ebola in the 
community, with focus on effective community mobilization. 
These messages were designed to increase the understanding of the EVD and make 
people less likely to become ill, to enhance the trust inside the community, to promote 
dialogue and community ownership of the response and to minimize psychological 




“By promoting community approaches and engaging survivors to work alongside other 
responders, WHO is helping to minimize stigmatization of communities affected by 
Ebola” (WHO, 2015). 
 
1.4.2.5. Other measures 
To limit national and international spread of the disease, the WHO implemented short-




 Implementation of specific programmes to ensure continuity of essential and 
supportive services in containment areas (primary care, food, ...); 
 If non-essential movement in and out of a containment area is stopped, ensure 
that essential movement continues unhindered, such as response providers and 
essential services; 
 To facilitate EVD response, mass gathering should be deferred until intensity of 
transmission is reduced; 
 Prohibit travel of all Ebola cases and contacts (with the exception of medical 
evacuation); 
 Implementations and monitoring of exit screening in international airports, 
seaports and major land crossings; 
 Align practices of all international airlines to the national travel policy. 
To ensure essential services and create the foundation for health sector recovery and 
strengthening of national core capacities for outbreak response the WHO priority 
activities were to: 
 Establish short-term capacity to address critical gaps in essential services, such 
as health, food, education, security, WASH, through national service providers, 
NGO‟s, UN agencies, humanitarian organizations and other partners, based on 
needs assessment and gaps analysis; 
 Develop a medium-term investment plan to strengthen health services that 
includes syndromic surveillance and laboratory networks to diagnose relevant 
pathogens; 





In September 2015, as the number of cases started decreasing, the goal of the response 
changed towards achieving and maintaining zero cases with the main objectives at this 
phase being: 





2. To identify, manage and respond to the consequences of residual Ebola risks. 
This last phase of the response (phase 3) aimed to build on the rapid scale-up of 
treatment beds, safe and dignified burial teams, and behaviour change capacities during 
phase 1 (August-December 2014) and enhanced capacities for case finding, contact 
tracing, and community engagement during phase 2 (January-July 2015). It also focused 
on incorporating new developments in Ebola control, such as vaccines, diagnostics and 




1.4.5. EVD outbreak in Sierra Leone 
1.4.5.1. About Sierra Leone 
 




The Republic of Sierra Leone is a country in the West African coast and part of the 54 
countries that make up the whole of the African Continent. It borders Guinea and 




The country is divided by 3 provinces (Eastern, Northern and Southern), one area 






 37% of its population resides in urban areas with 
an expectancy for this number to increase due to 
the significant rural to urban migration 
happening; 
 52% of the population is female with an average 
fertility rate of 5.1 children per woman; 25% of 
the population constitute women of the 
reproductive age (15-49); 55% of the population 
are adolescents and 20% are infants and children 
under 5 years of age; 
 45% of men and 27% of women are literate; 
 20 languages in total are spoken in the country, 
being English the official language;  




It‟s one of the poorest countries in the World, ranking180/187 in the United Nations 
Programme for Development Human Development Index.
73
 “The health status of the 
people of Sierra Leone is still among the worst in the world. Infant and maternal 
mortality rates remain among the highest in the world. According to the Sierra Leone 
demographic health survey 2008, life expectancy is 47 years, infant mortality rate is 89 
per 1000 live births, under-five mortality rate is 140 per 1000 live births and maternal 
mortality ratio is 857 per 100 000 births. Fertility rates are high due to low 
contraceptive use prevalence rate.” (ROA, WHO, 2009). 
Since the decade of civil war which ended in 2002, that health service delivery in the 
country has been a challenge due to the damages it created in the health system. It has 
been substantially dependent on external resources for funding, such as the Asian 
Development Bank, the Department for International Development (DFID, now known 
as UKAID), the United Nations Children‟s Fund, the United Nations Population Fund 
and the World Bank; and the weakness of the health system continues to undermine 
standards, availability and accessibility of the services provided.
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Fig. 17 Flag 




The governmental body responsible for coordinating health interventions, actions and 
human workforce in the country is the Ministry of Health and Sanitation (MoHS). It 
worked with development partners mainly to implement the “National Health Sector 
Strategic Plan”, a 6 year plan created in 2009 to provide a framework for improving the 
health of the nation by 2015.
67
 This plan was mainly focused on fighting HIV, Malaria 
and Tuberculosis and supporting maternal and child care (Millennium Development 




The EVD outbreak greatly disrupted the basic essential (non-Ebola) health services in 
the country, exacerbating the existing weaknesses of the health system and making it 
even more fragile.
68
 If a health system is ill-equipped to deal with a disease outbreak or 




1.4.5.2. The outbreak in Sierra Leone 
A young woman who was admitted into a governmental hospital after a miscarriage on 
the 25
th
 of May, 2014, was the first confirmed Ebola case in Sierra Leone.
30,75
 
According to the WHO, the infection entered the country from the neighbouring country 
Guinea via a traditional healer who lived in Sierra Leone and worked in both Sierra 
Leone and Guinea. The traditional healer became infected and died. Hundreds of 
mourners attended the funeral and it‟s suspected that as many as 365 Ebola deaths are 
linked to this event.
30
 
The outbreak started with this young woman in the Kenema district, quickly spreading 
to nearby Kailahun district and the Eastern Province adjacent to the epicentre of the 
outbreak in Guinea. It reached the capital, Freetown, on the 11
th
 of July 2014, where it 
easily grew into bombastic numbers due to the overcrowded conditions and fluid 
population movements.
30,70 
Sierra Leone declared a state of emergency on the 6
th
 of August 2014, two days before 
the International Public Health Emergency being declared by the WHO, and the 
strategic plan of the UNMEER started its implementation in October 2014, same time 




coordinate this response via the EVD Response pillars: case management, infection 
prevention and control (IPC) and safe burials, surveillance (and contact tracing), social 
mobilization and psychosocial support.
70,76,78 
In total, the epidemic in Sierra Leone saw 14 124 notified cases and 3 956 notified 
deaths. It affected 114 of the 150 chiefdoms, reached its peak in the final quarter of 








According to the Ministry of Health and Sanitation (MoHS) of Sierra Leone (2014), the 
challenges that contributed to this massive outbreak included:
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 “Inadequate understanding within the communities of the EVD as this is the first 
major outbreak reported in Sierra Leone. 
 Lack of experience among healthcare workers and limited capacities for rapid 
response. 
 High exposure to Ebola virus in the communities through household care and 
customary burial procedures. This has resulted in high level of community 
deaths leading to panic and anxiety. 
 Denial, mistrust and rejection of proposed public health interventions arising 




 Fear of the disease by frontline health workers leading to either suboptimal care 
for patients or substandard implementation of protective measures. 
 Close community ties and movement within and across borders has led to 
difficulties in tracking and following up of contacts for the three countries. 
 The magnitude and the geographical extent of the EVD outbreak in Sierra Leone 
require significant and robust response capacities and structures. This outbreak 
poses serious challenges in terms of human capacity, financial, operational and 
logistic requirements and threatens national and international heath.” 
Fang et al (2016), mentions that the multilayer control interventions placed during the 
last quarter of 2014 were associated with 43% reduction of the population-level 
transmission risk during intervention phase I and 65% reduction during intervention 
phase II; these included the establishment and operation of diagnostic and healthcare 
facilities and the national and regional campaigns to improve case isolation and safe 
burial (further details about these measures were already mentioned during the Ebola 
Response section). 
 
1.4.5.3. The outbreak in Nieni Chiefdom, Koinadugu district, Sierra Leone 
Koinadugu was the last District of Sierra Leone to be affected by the epidemic; it 
reached the district by October 2014 even after the local chiefs had imposed measures 
to prevent the entrance of the virus into the district, such as quarantine, barred travel and 
created a system of official distribution vans and trucks to help farmers and traders to 
get their products into the neighbouring markets. The hotspot was in Nieni Chiefdom, 
being the most affected towns: Kumala, Fankuya and Sumbaria.
77
 
The outbreak in this Chiefdom lasted from October 2014 to Mach 2015. During the first 
4 months of the outbreak, Kumala‟s primary school was used as a CCC, named “old 
Kumala” (aereal picture below). In total, old Kumala admitted 139 patients and saw 70 
confirmed cases. In May 2015, a Holding Centre was created with a 20 bed capacity, 
named “new Kumala”.
78
 New Kumala never saw a confirmed Ebola case until its 




The last confirmed EVD case in Nieni Chiefdom (Kumala‟s CCC) was documented on 
the 15
th
 of March 2015 adding to a total of 108 cases in this area.
34
 The district itself 
saw a total of 229 cases
36
 and was only declared Ebola free on the 29
th
 of May 2015, 





Fig. 20 Aerial view from old Kumala (Médicos del Mundo, 2015). 
 
1.4.5.4. “End of Ebola Outbreak in Sierra Leone” statement 
Delivered by Dr. Anders Nordström, WHO Representative in Sierra Leone on the 
7
th
 of November, 2015, Freetown, Sierra Leone: 
 “Today, 7 November 2015, the World Health Organization declares the end of the 




Since Sierra Leone recorded the first Ebola case on 24 May 2014, a total number of 
8,704 people were infected and 3,589 have died. From those who tragically lost their 
lives, 221 of them were healthcare workers. We remember them all today. 
We are now moving into a new phase of 90 days enhanced surveillance which will run 
until 5 February 2016. This new phase is critical as our goal is to ensure a resilient zero 
and that we can detect and respond to any potential Ebola flare ups. This period is about 
ensuring that we can consolidate the gains of existing systems to manage future risks. 
The World Health Organization commends the Government of Sierra Leone and the 
people of Sierra Leone for the significant achievement of ending this Ebola outbreak. 
The World had never faced an Ebola outbreak of this scale and magnitude and the 
World has neither seen a nation mobilizing its people and resources as Sierra Leone 
did.  The power of the people of Sierra Leone is the reason why we could put an end to 
this outbreak today. 
This power of the people and the foundation now in place needs to be further nurtured 
and supported in order to build a strong and resilient public health system which stands 
ready to contain the next outbreak of a disease, Ebola or any other public health threat. 
Under the leadership of the Sierra Leonean Government, an effective response was 
initiated to manage the outbreak.  The use of rapid response teams and strong 
community involvement to identify new cases early and quickly stop any Ebola virus 
transmission should continue to be the cornerstone of the national response strategy.  
WHO will maintain an enhanced staff presence in Sierra Leone as the response 
transitions from outbreak control, to support enhanced vigilance and to the recovery of 
essential health services. 
The Ebola outbreak has decimated families, the health system, the economy and social 




WHO is confident that the Government of Sierra Leone together with its national and 
international partners will use the foundation already in place; dedicated and trained 
health workers; systems for alerts and information management; community 
engagement and care for people – to deal with other priority health problems, child 




In January 2016 the NERC seized its operations and its responsibilities were taken over 









The main goal of this study is to understand if there‟s any relation between the 
symptoms during the acute stage of EVD and the sequelae that survivors present moths 
after recovery. 
 
Materials and Methods 
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3. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
3.1. Study design and participants 
This is a case reports study following the symptoms of 10 EVD survivors on the 
moment of admission to Kumala‟s Holding Centre and months after. 
The population of the study was selected between the 57 Ebola Case Investigation 
forms (appendix 9) filled out on time of admission to Kumala‟s Holding Centre between 
the dates of 27
th
 of November 2014 and 14
th
 of March 2015. 
From the 57 admissions there were 15 confirmed cases, of which 11 survived. Since it 
was impossible to find information about symptoms months after discharge from one of 
the survivors, the population of the study made a total of 10 survivors. 
 
3.2. Ethical considerations 
Kumala‟s Holding Centre was created as part of the Ebola Response strategy 
implemented in Koinadugu district, Sierra Leone. The NGO Médicos del Mundo – 
Spain – were responsible for the case management and running of this centre. 
The official owners of the data collected for this study are the Ministry of Health and 
Sanitation of Sierra Leone and the Koinadugu District Ebola Response Centre. 
Authorization has been granted to MdM by the Ministry of Health and Sanitation of 
Sierra Leone to use the data collected from any MdM projects. 
Since I was working at Kumala‟s HC as part of this NGO, I requested their 
authorization to pursue this study and present it as my Masters of Tropical Health 
dissertation, which was granted. It is however to be mentioned that the copyrights of 
this study will be shared between myself, the Lisbon School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine and Médicos del Mundo – Spain. 
None of the survivors name or village is mentioned in the study; instead they have been 
numbered at random from 1 to 10. The demographics of the study‟s population will be 
mentioned without linking any data to any survivor. The only information linked 
directly to the survivor‟s number will be the symptoms they presented on admission to 
Materials and Methods 
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the HC, 8 months and 10 months after, since these symptoms are the core of the 
presented study. 
 
3.3. Data collection 
As mentioned, the symptoms of the 10 survivors upon admission to Kumala‟s HC were 
obtained from the Ebola Case Investigation Forms used during triage (a sample of the 
form can be found on appendix 9). The symptoms from 8 months after admission were 
obtained by the psychosocial team working with EVD survivors in Koinadugu district 
as part of the Médicos del Mundo (MdM) team and granted to me upon request. The 10 
months data was collected during an Uveitis program held in Kumala during October 
2015, where all the survivors from the district gathered and were screened for uveitis 
symptoms by an ophthalmologist team and were also seen by a doctor (part of the MdM 
team) for a medical check-up post EVD; the symptoms were collected from the form 
used by the MdM doctor during this check-up. 
 
3.4. Data analysis 
The data analysis will be descriptive statistics, even though the statistics will have little 
scientific validity due to the low sample‟s number. Future studies with larger 







From the 10 survivors, six were females and four males with ages between 5 and 47 
years old. Seven had a known contact with a person with EVD (dead or alive) in the 30 
days that preceded the symptoms upon admission to the HC. The statistical analysis can 
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Six out of the ten survivors studied (60%) presented with one or more of the same 
symptoms months after admission to the centre that they had when the disease was at its 
acute stage. Four still had headaches ten months after, three maintained weakness, one 
eye problems, one abdominal pain and another joint pain. 
Six survivors (60%) were admitted to KHC presenting severe disease and five survivors 
(50%) presented severe sequelae up to 10 months after admission, however, from the 
six that presented severe disease during the acute stage, only three of them also 
developed severe sequelae. 
The following table presents the results regarding the number of symptoms during the 
three studied stages. When there are five or more symptoms present at that time the 
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To be noted that, with the exception of survivor number four, whose data is incomplete, 
all survivors presented with two or more symptoms 10 months after admission to KHC. 
The number of symptoms noted during the three mentioned stages is tabled below. 
Symptoms On admission 8 months after 10 months after 
Fever 6  (60%) 1  (12,5%)  
Vomiting 2  (20%)   
Diarrhoea 3  (30%)   
Fatigue  1  (12,5%) 6  (66.7%) 
Weakness 5  (50%) 3  (37,5%) 6  (66,7%) 
Weight loss 8  (80%) 3  (37,5%)  
Appetite loss  2  (25%) 2  (22,2%) 
Abdominal pain 4  (40%) 4  (50%)  
Joint pain 7  (70%) 2  (25%) 4  (44,4%) 
Muscle pain 5  (50%)   
Back pain   6  (66,7%) 
Chest pain   5  (55,6%) 
Headache 5  (50%) 3  (37,5%) 6  (66,7%) 
Difficulties breathing 4  (40%)   
Difficulties swallowing 2  (20%)   
Hiccups  -   
Skin rash 1  (10%)   
Eye problems 3  (30%) 4  (50%) 3  (33,3%) 
Hearing problems   1  (11,1%) 




Mood disturbance   2  (22,2%) 
Bleeding 2  (20%)   
 
Unfortunately, I was unable to access the data from two survivors 8 months after the 
admission to the HC and one other survivor didn‟t show up to the post-EVD mobile 
clinic held 10 months later, which is why the percentages for the 8 months after results 
are calculated out of eight survivors and for 10 months after out of nine survivors 
instead of 10. 
A full list of the 10 survivor‟s symptoms on admission to the Holding Centre, 8 months 






The 2014-2015 West Africa Ebola Outbreak was the largest ever reported in the World. 
It started in December 2013 and was left unnoticed for 3 months, allowing for the virus 
to keep spreading uncontrollably and for the outbreak to keep escalating until it was 
declared an International emergency in August 2014. Despite the large number of 
cases/deaths recorded, it is to be noted that underreporting was a big issue, especially in 
the first months of the outbreak, having been predicted by the WHO that the real 
number of cases during this time was probably 2 to 4 times higher than reported
43
. 
This was the first ever documented Ebola outbreak outside of Central Africa and it was 
unmatched in duration and size. Several factors can be contributed to this, such as 
decades of conflict, increasing population growth, poverty, ethnic and linguistic 
fragmentation, poor health infrastructures and cultural practices. Due to sociological 
and economic factors, there‟s also a large scale movement of populations in the area, 
both within and between countries, greatly influencing the spread of the disease.
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As mentioned, the fact that the outbreak affected extremely poor countries, with 
severely compromised health systems, lack of knowledge about the virus (and 
consequent stigma associated with it) and certain kinds of human-to-human contacts, 
based on religious, behavioural and cultural practices, what led to the rapid spread and 
increasing fear of the disease. On the other hand, the spread of the virus aggravated the 
already weakened health system and the fragile social, political and economic 
conditions of these countries, turning the situation into a vicious cycle where urgent 
international aid was needed to support the affected countries. 
Led and coordinated by the WHO, in partnership with several other UN agencies, 
national governments and other partners, an international response was established to 
provide the necessary support to the affected countries. This was done by 1) 
intensifying response activities, focusing on case management, case finding 
(surveillance) and contact tracing, safe and dignifies burials, laboratory and social 
mobilization; and by 2) strengthening national capacities, including the creation of 
ETC‟s, CCC‟s, HC‟s, burial teams, laboratories and the deployment of large amounts of 
international staff to work on the field, not only on the centres (since the number of 




an issue due to the extremely high number of health care workers who were infected 
and died of the virus), but also engaging with local communities and workers, leading to 
an increasing understanding about the disease itself, it‟s transmission and necessary 
infection control strategies that needed to be continuously implemented in order to 
reduce transmission, with emphasis on IPC measures and proper use of PPE. 
“Achieving real community understanding, ownership and implementation of any 
complementary approaches, particularly given the deep-rooted fear and stigmatization 
in the affected areas, required sustained mobilization, engagement and dialogue with 
community, religious, traditional and other local leaders, woman‟s and young groups, as 
well as traditional healers, to build collective trust and confidence in the response 
efforts and community action” (WHO, 2014). 
Community health care workers played a particularly vital role in “delivering messages, 
addressing stigma and implementing complementary approaches to EVD control” 
(WHO, 2014), since the fear of this disease led individuals to flee Ebola centres 
believing they would die there or simple not seek healthcare and revert to traditional 
healers or family members instead. Being an Ebola healthcare worker was, however, 
very challenging in such communities since they were awfully stigmatized and rejected 
by their communities, believing they were acting as reservoirs for the virus. The same 
would be applicable for EVD survivors.
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Fear of stigmatization, alongside burial practices, were probably the main factors that 
contributed to the magnitude of this outbreak. Burial practices due to the lack of IPC 
measures during the ceremonies and fear of stigmatization since it influenced disease 
reporting, pursuing healthcare and overall denial of the disease. 
Knowing that the transmission of the virus is done by direct contact and taking into 
account the behavioural practices of the affected communities, IPC measures were the 
centre of the intensified control strategies set by the Ebola Response Roadmap, in 
August 2014, assuming that these would be enough to stop any new transmission within 
8 weeks of the index case. It required mobilization of several resources, including 




Some examples of the complementary control activities implemented, aside from the 
ones already mentioned, were: 1) all movement of people to and from 
contaminated/quarantined areas was limited to response providers and essential 
services; 2) mass gatherings were forbidden during the peak of the outbreak and until 
the intensity of the virus transmission was reduced, this included closing of schools, 
bars, restaurants and even of public Christmas celebrations; 3) mandatory temperature 
checks at various checkpoints including  hand washing with weak chlorine solution; 4) 
implementation of airport, seaport and major land crossings screenings; 5) establishing 
short-term capacity to address critical gaps in essential services, including health, food, 
education, protection and WASH, by national, international service providers, NGO‟s, 
UN agencies, humanitarian organizations and other partners. 
Taking into account that it took the affected countries 3 months to realise there was an 
Ebola Outbreak devastating their land and the International Health Agencies 5 months 
after that to declare it a Global Emergency, it is to be questioned if the activities 
developed at that point were enough to fight the alarming way the virus was spreading 
at the time. The Ebola Response Roadmap created by the WHO in August 2014 set the 
goal “to stop Ebola transmission in affected countries within 6-9 months and prevent 
international spread”. This target largely failed, since the end of the outbreak was only 
declared almost 15 months after. However, it did manage to significantly slow down the 
transmission significantly by January 2015, five months after the Ebola Response 
implementation. 
From a scientific perspective, the unprecedented high number of cases and subsequent 
survivors during this outbreak allowed for a lot of research to be done. Nonetheless, it is 
still not enough and a lot of questions still remain regarding EVD and PEVDS. 
Both short and long term complications have been reported on EVD survivors, ranging 
from physical to psychological and social. In addition, the persistence of EVD in 
selected body compartments of the survivors poses a great risk of reintroduction of the 
virus in areas where transmission has previously been eliminated.
51 
The PREVAIL III 
study that began in Liberia in June 2015 and that will last for 5 years, is tracking around 
1500 EVD survivors and should bring some insight into the long-term consequences of 




Preliminary findings are already indicating that 68% of survivors hold neurological 
complications, 60% eye problems and 53% musculoskeletal complications, and that 
EVD can be found in the semen of male survivors up to 18 months post EVD.
84,85  
This 
is the largest scale survivors study being done and, in comparison with the study 
presented on this dissertation, neurological (headaches) and musculoskeletal (mainly 
weakness and back pain) were also the more prevalent sequelae found. 
From the data collected in this study, the majority of survivors were females (60%), 
with an average age of 25 years old (ages ranging from 5 to 47 years) and with 70% of 
them referring having had contact with a person with known EVD (dead or alive) in the 
30 days prior to admission to the HC. The fact that there were more female survivors 
than male is in accordance with a study done by the WHO Ebola Response Team, 
mentioned in an article of “The New England Journal of Medicine”, in January 2016, 
stating that there is a higher survival rate amongst female individuals
83
. 
The most common symptoms recorded on admission (during the active stage of EVD), 
were weight loss, joint pain and fever; and months after (post EVD) were headache, 
fatigue, weakness and back pain (which could also be related to the sample‟s 
professions and not the EVD itself, since most of them were farmers and since 
musculoskeletal pain is a common complaint in the general population of Sierra Leone). 
The psychological complications were not evaluated during this study. However and 
taking into account what was mentioned before, alongside previous studies done, it is 
clear that “mental health problems are probably the most prevalent” complications 
(Marta Lado, as cited by T. Burki, 2016), being depression, anxiety, post-traumatic 
stress disorder and survivor guilt some of the most common symptoms noted.
84 
More 
studies would still need to be done on this subject. 
Gastrointestinal (GI) symptoms weren‟t very prevalent on these patients upon 
admission to the HC, which could be related to the fact that GI symptoms tend to appear 
at a more advanced stage of the acute disease and that the survivors studied could‟ve 
still been on the initial stage of the disease when admitted. Also, the low frequency of 
haemorrhagic symptoms it is in accordance with other studies done, alike in a study 








Sixty per cent (6 in 10) of survivors presented with one or more of the symptoms they 
had during the acute stage of the disease months after recovery, being headache the 
most common symptom to persist, followed by weakness. However, all survivors 
presented with one or more symptom months after recovery, regardless of the symptoms 
existing during the acute stage of the disease (with the exception of one survivor whose 
data is incomplete).  
A study done by Scott et al, published by the “Emerging Infectious Diseases” in April 
2016, also found that all the survivors studied (44 in total) had between one to five post-
Ebola complaints (on average 2), 70% with musculoskeletal pain, 48% with headaches 
and 14% with ocular problems
86
. This is in keeping with the results found by this study, 
although it is to be mentioned that the Scott et al study was done on survivors only 3 
weeks after discharged from an ETC. 
The pathogenic and biological events that lead to the development of PEVDS are still 
unclear and more studies still need to be done on that subject however and taking in 
consideration a symptomatic approach, this particular study concludes that the 
severity of the disease doesn’t seem to be associated with the severity of the 
sequelae (both defined here by the presence of 5 or more symptoms at a time), since 
while there were 3 survivors with severe disease that developed severe sequelae, 3 
didn‟t; and while 2 survivors with non-severe disease developed severe sequelae other 2 
remained non severe throughout. 
However, challenges to this study include the fact that I was only able to analyse a small 
sample, only 10 survivors, making it difficult to obtain more concrete conclusions. 
There‟s also the fact that I didn‟t have access to symptoms from 2 survivors 8 months 
after the acute stage of the disease and from 1 survivor 10 months after. And finally, the 
fact that I was unable to access the records from what happened to the survivors after 
admission to the Holding Centre or after they had been transferred to the ETC, not 
allowing me to know how the symptoms developed and making it difficult to compare 
how the severity of the disease could be related to the PEVD symptoms. Knowledge of 




data information to study to understand if the viral load would have any effect to the 
symptoms during PEVDS. 
With that in mind, it is difficult to conclude from this study if the symptoms during 
the acute stage of the EVD play an important role in the symptoms seen at PEVDS, 
more studies overcoming the challenges presented here would be needed. 
It would be interesting to continue with studies on EVD survivors, taking into account a 
larger sample and including more information, such as the psychological effects 
presented by survivors, all the symptoms that patients presented during the acute stage, 
from the onset of these until discharge from the ETC, how and when did sequelae 
started manifesting, the viral load of the patients during the acute stage of the disease 
and when the symptoms are at its worst and, possibly, making a correlation between all 
of the above and the remaining of the virus in selected body compartments, such as the 
eye and the semen. 
In conclusion, and in the words of Anders Nordstrom, WHO‟s representative in Sierra 
Leone, as cited by Gullard (2015): “we have never had such large number of survivors. 
This is very new. We have a unique and important responsibility to provide care and 
support for Ebola survivors trying to restart their normal lives. It is increasingly clear 
that emerging from an Ebola treatment unit is just the beginning. The countries affected 
by Ebola also have a long road to recovery”.
29  
In Sierra Leone specifically, the President Ernest Bai Koroma, has promised a 




Now that the countries have embarked on the recovery journey post Ebolavirus 
Outbreak, focus needs to be held on other health care problems aside from Ebola, this 
includes strengthening the current health care systems and restoring essential health 
services. With such high resource gaps in the health care systems, how can local 
Governments provide proper care for the survivors? Also, failures in health care 
systems leads to high mortality from vaccine-preventable and easily-treatable diseases. 




immunizations and vaccinations; maternal, newborn, child and adolescent health; and 
communicable diseases, with an emphasis on Malaria, TB and HIV.
 80
 
Nonetheless, maintaining IPC measures, laboratory diagnosis, surveillance systems, 
community engagement, simulations, training, strong workforces and rapid response 
teams are also important in this recovery stage, since the possibility of re-introduction 
of the virus in the communities by survivors it‟s still a harsh reality and the three Ebola-
impacted countries remain at high risk of additional small outbreaks.
81
  
Since West Africa was declared Ebola-free on the 14
th
 of January of 2016, with all three 
countries having reached zero cases, there have been small flare-ups in Sierra Leone, 
Guinea and Liberia and it is expected that more might still happen in the near future. 
Prevention and preparedness are essential to protect populations, not only regarding the 
residual Ebola risk from survivors, but also of any kind of communicable disease 
epidemic that could lead to an outbreak.
82
 The WHO has created tools such as an 
“Ebola Virus Disease Consolidated Preparedness Checklist” that aims to assist countries 
in assessing their level of readiness and in identifying concrete actions to be taken to 
address identified gaps or a “Hospital preparedness for epidemics” providing 
information on how hospitals and health care facilities can accomplish their role in 
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Appendix 3: Case Pauline 
Article from MebMD Health News 
 
“Nurse With Ebola, Pauline Cafferkey, Back in Hospital 
Peter Russell | February 23, 2016 
 
Scottish nurse Pauline Cafferkey has been transferred to a specialist hospital in London for the third time 
since contracting Ebola in 2014. 
The transfer came hours after the 40-year-old from South Lanarkshire was admitted to the Queen 
Elizabeth University Hospital in Glasgow for routine monitoring at the Infectious Diseases Unit. 
RAF Flight  
She was put on an RAF Hercules aircraft which is flying her to London for transfer to the Royal Free 
Hospital in London. 
Ms Cafferkey has been treated in the hospital specialist isolation unit twice during 2015 after contracting 
Ebola in Sierra Leone in 2014. 
The Royal Free has issued a statement, saying: "We can confirm that Pauline Cafferkey is being 
transferred to the Royal Free Hospital due to a late complication from her previous infection by the Ebola 
virus. She will now be treated by the hospital's infectious diseases team under nationally agreed 
guidelines. 
"The Ebola virus can only be transmitted by direct contact with the blood or bodily fluids of an infected 
person while they are symptomatic so the risk to the general public remains low and the NHS has well 
established and practised infection control procedures in place." 
Earlier, NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde had described Ms Cafferkey's condition as 'stable'. 
Ms Cafferkey was first admitted to the high level isolation unit (HLIU) at the Royal Free Hospital in 
December 2014 after contracting the disease while working as part of a British team at the Kerry Town 






She was re-admitted to the Royal Free HLIU on the 8th October 2015 after the virus triggered a case of 
viral meningitis. 
Bodily tissues can harbour Ebola for some time after a patient appears to have recovered. 
At one stage after her re-admission, Ms Cafferkey's condition was described as 'critical', but she was well 
enough to be discharged from the isolation unit on 12th November last year. 
It is not yet known what has prompted her re-admission today. 
The Royal Free Hospital in London has an isolation unit and infection control protocols with specially 
trained staff ready to deal with Ebola cases. 
'A More Complex Disease Than Imagined'  
Dr Derek Gatherer, lecturer in the Division of Biomedical and Life Sciences at Lancaster University, 
comments in a statement: "It is now becoming clear that Ebola is a far more complex disease than we 
previously imagined. The very large number of cases in West Africa since the end of 2013, have 
displayed a wide range of rare but extremely unpleasant consequences for those who survive their first 
battle with the disease. 
"The meningitis that Ms Cafferkey suffered from at the end of last year is one of the most serious 
complications of all, as it can be life-threatening. She was unlucky enough to be one of only a handful of 
patients in whom it has been seen." 
Dr Gatherer says the other main, but rare, complication seen in patients is eye inflammation which can 
lead to blindness, while joint aches, headaches and general tiredness can last for months after recovery 
from Ebola. 
"Up to half of Ebola survivors will have some or several of this milder range of symptoms," says Dr 
Gatherer. "Although not life-threatening, these can be problematic, especially in societies like west Africa 
where a large number of people make their living from agricultural labour." 
SOURCES:  
Royal Free London NHS Foundation Trust. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde. Science Media Centre.  
Reviewed on February 23, 2016” 















Appendix 5: Cleaning and disinfection in the ETC 
 
 























































Appendix 10: Table of results 
Symptoms of the 10 survivors on admission to the HC, 8 and 10 months after 
 
 




8M AFTER 10M AFTER 
ON 
ADMISSION 
8M AFTER 10M AFTER 
FEVER X           
VOMITING X           
DIARRHOEA             
FATIQUE             
WEAKNESS X       X   
WEIGHT LOSS X       X   
APPETITE LOSS         X X 
ADBOMINAL PAIN X         X 
JOINT PAIN X           
MUSCLE PAIN X           
BACK PAIN           X 
CHEST PAIN     X       
HEADACHE X X X X     
DIF. BREATHING             
DIF. SWALLOWING             
HICCUPS             
SKIN RASH             
EYE PROBLEMS         X X 
HEARING PROBLEMS             
SLEEPING PROBLEMS             
MOOD DISTURBANCE             
BLEEDING             
 
 




8M AFTER 10M AFTER 
ON 
ADMISSION 
8M AFTER 10M AFTER 
FEVER   X   X   
NO DATA 
VOMITING           
DIARRHOEA           
FATIQUE     X     
WEAKNESS X X X     
WEIGHT LOSS X X   X   
APPETITE LOSS   X       




JOINT PAIN X X   X   
MUSCLE PAIN X         
BACK PAIN     X     
CHEST PAIN     X     
HEADACHE   X X     
DIF. BREATHING X     X   
DIF. SWALLOWING X         
HICCUPS           
SKIN RASH           
EYE PROBLEMS X X X   X 
HEARING PROBLEMS           
SLEEPING PROBLEMS           
MOOD DISTURBANCE           
BLEEDING           
 
 




8M AFTER 10M AFTER 
ON 
ADMISSION 





X     
VOMITING         
DIARRHOEA X X     
FATIQUE       X 
WEAKNESS X X   X 
WEIGHT LOSS X X     
APPETITE LOSS         
ADBOMINAL PAIN X       
JOINT PAIN X X   X 
MUSCLE PAIN X X     
BACK PAIN       X 
CHEST PAIN         
HEADACHE   X   X 
DIF. BREATHING X X     
DIF. SWALLOWING   X     
HICCUPS         
SKIN RASH         
EYE PROBLEMS X   X X 
HEARING PROBLEMS         
SLEEPING PROBLEMS         
MOOD DISTURBANCE       X 










8M AFTER 10M AFTER 
ON 
ADMISSION 




  X 
NO DATA 
  
VOMITING         
DIARRHOEA         
FATIQUE   X   X 
WEAKNESS   X   X 
WEIGHT LOSS X   X   
APPETITE LOSS         
ADBOMINAL PAIN         
JOINT PAIN   X X   
MUSCLE PAIN     X   
BACK PAIN   X     
CHEST PAIN   X     
HEADACHE X X     
DIF. BREATHING         
DIF. SWALLOWING         
HICCUPS         
SKIN RASH     X   
EYE PROBLEMS X       
HEARING PROBLEMS         
SLEEPING PROBLEMS         
MOOD DISTURBANCE         
BLEEDING         
 
 




8M AFTER 10M AFTER 
ON 
ADMISSION 
8M AFTER 10M AFTER 
FEVER             
VOMITING X           
DIARRHOEA X           
FATIQUE     X   X X 
WEAKNESS   X X X X X 
WEIGHT LOSS X       X   
APPETITE LOSS           X 
ADBOMINAL PAIN X X X   X   
JOINT PAIN     X X X X 
MUSCLE PAIN             
BACK PAIN     X     X 
CHEST PAIN     X     X 




DIF. BREATHING             
DIF. SWALLOWING             
HICCUPS             
SKIN RASH             
EYE PROBLEMS             
HEARING PROBLEMS           X 
SLEEPING PROBLEMS           X 
MOOD DISTURBANCE           X 
BLEEDING X           
 
 
